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We analyze the optimal decision-making hierarchy in an organi-
zation when decision-makers of limited liability have preferences con-
ﬂicting with the organization’s objective and exert externalities on
their counterparts. In a horizontal hierarchy, every decision is made
by a diﬀerent agent. In a vertical hierarchy, one agent is in charge of
all decisions. Only this agent is incentivized. This advantage is out-
weighed if there is a horizontal hierarchy so that the decision-makers’
preferences are close to the organization’s objective with respect to
the decision they are in charge of but far from the organization’s ob-
jective for the other decisions.
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A lot of start-up ﬁrms in the New Economy sector are characterized - among
other attributes - by very ﬂat hierarchies implying decentralized decision-
making, while more traditionally structured ﬁrms often have a very small
number of decision-making superiors and a large number of subordinates.
The paper provides a possible explanation for the occurrence of these diﬀer-
ent structures based upon the alignment of the ﬁrm members’ preferences
and the character of the decisions to be made. In either hierarchy, decision-
makers exert externalities on the other members of the organization. If, for
example, a software ﬁrm changes the features of a certain product, this de-
cision aﬀects the work of the software developer as well as the marketing
specialist, whoever has made the decision. As a matter of taste, the poten-
tial decision-makers have diﬀerent preferences with respect to the design of
the product that may conﬂict with the ﬁrm’s objective. If contracts are in-
complete, these preferences inﬂuence the optimal allocation of decision rights
and therefore the optimal hierarchy of the ﬁrm.
In this paper, we develop a simple model of the hierarchical structure
of an organization. We consider a principal who hires two agents in order
to undertake a project. The agents are protected by limited liability. Two
non-contractible project-oriented decisions have to be made, which may be
viewed as two subprojects to be chosen. The decision rights are contractu-
ally assigned to the agents, the decisions themselves remain unveriﬁable ex
post. The allocation of decision rights determines the hierarchy. In a vertical
(or steep) hierarchy, one person is in charge of all decisions and might be
viewed as the other persons’ superior. In a horizontal (or ﬂat) hierarchy,
every decision is made by a diﬀerent person. Independent of the hierarchy,
the decisions inﬂuence the expected project output and both agents’ private
costs, which reﬂect their preferences. The agents have diﬀerent cost func-
tions, but both agents’ preferences are not aligned with the principal’s goal
of maximizing the expected project output. The further the implemented
decisions are away from an agent’s favorite decisions, the larger are his costs.
The costs are separable with respect to the decisions, any interaction among
the subprojects is covered by the expected project output. We assume a
binary output which is zero in case of failure and positive in case of suc-
cess. The project output is veriﬁable so that payments can condition on it.
To align the decision-makers’ interests with the objective of maximizing ex-
pected project output, the principal has to provide incentives.
If transfers are unrestricted, the hierarchy has no impact. The principal
2can always extract the whole surplus so that she implements the surplus-
maximizing decisions, ﬁrst-best eﬃciency is attained. Under limited liabil-
ity, the principal faces a trade oﬀ between surplus maximization and rent
extraction. To compensate the decision-makers for a surplus maximizing de-
cision behavior forces the principal to give up a share of the surplus. This
trade oﬀ is present under any hierarchy, but the hierarchy impacts how it
is solved. In a vertical hierarchy, there is only one decision-maker who has
to be incentivized. This advantage might be outweighed if the agents’ pref-
erences are diﬀerent so that one of the agents has larger marginal costs for
subproject 1 than for subproject 2 while for the other agent, it is the other
way around. In this case, switching from the vertical to the horizontal hierar-
chy reduces the expected wage payment of the former superior but increases
the expected wage payment of the former subordinate. This pays out if, for
every agent, his marginal costs for the two subprojects are suﬃciently diﬀer-
ent. That might be viewed as a result of the decisions being very dissimilar.
Even in the optimal hierarchy, the principal does not necessarily implement
a ﬁrst-best eﬃcient project since she may be better of with a larger share of
a smaller surplus.
The cost functions cover (dis)similarities between the agents, but also be-
tween the decisions. If the agents have identical preferences with respect to
a subproject, their marginal costs for this subproject are the same. If, on the
other hand, the subprojects are very similar in the sense that their impact
on the agents is identical, an agent’s marginal costs are the same for the two
subprojects. For example, consider the assembly-line workers in a car fac-
tory. They are all strongly concerned about a decision that aﬀects their task
but hardly concerned about the design of the cars. The agents are similar,
but the decisions dissimilar. All agents have large marginal costs for the ﬁrst
decision and small marginal costs for the second decision. Diﬀerently, in an
advertising agency, the graphic artist might suﬀer a lot from a decision for
a dull layout while the ad writer is hardly aﬀected, but the ad writer may
be annoyed at a decision concerning the text which hardly aﬀects the artist.
In this example, the decisions as well as the agents are very dissimilar. To
interpret our result, we can say that a horizontal hierarchy is optimal if the
agents as well as the decisions are diverse.
In our model, we assume the decisions to be non-contractible so that the
contracts remain incomplete. Instead of specifying the decisions themselves,
the principal can contractually assign the right to make (one or both of)
them, that is, she can allocate authority. Such a concept is also used in,
for example, Grossman and Hart (1986), Aghion and Bolton (1992), Bester
3(2005) and Schmitz (2005). To enforce a certain allocation of authority, the
principal can use, for example, asset ownership so that a transfer of decision
rights is in fact a transfer of property rights. This property rights approach
is based on Grossman and Hart (1986) and usually assumes decisions which
are not describable at the contracting stage but veriﬁable at the bargaining
stage.1 Diﬀerent from that, we assume our decisions to remain unveriﬁable
ex post and therefore follow Aghion and Bolton (1992), Schmitz (2005) and
Bester (2005). Aghion and Rey (2002) show that the optimality of this ap-
proach is often robust to the introduction of message games, which justiﬁes
our modeling choice. In our model, there is no information transmission from
the subordinate to the superior. Diﬀerent from Aghion and Tirole (1997),
our superior cannot rubberstamp his subordinate. The subordinate in our
model simply does not choose any action.
The agents’ costs from undertaking the project might represent disutility
from work, but it is rather the agents’ taste which determines the costs. We
do not model eﬀort2 choices or task3 assignment since the agent’s costs are de-
termined by all decisions no matter who has made them. Therefore, we diﬀer
from Schmitz (2005) who uses eﬀort decisions in a model that describes the
allocation of control rights. Similar to our model, private beneﬁts in Aghion
and Bolton (1992) do not depend on the allocation of decision rights. In our
model, an agent in charge of a decision exerts an externality on the other
agent, which is similar to Bester (2005). He models cost complementarities
or substitutabilities which aﬀect the eﬃciency of decisions, but since he does
not allow for incentive payments, they do not inﬂuence the agents’ decision
behavior. In diﬀerence, the cost functions in our model are assumed to be
separable with respect to the two decisions. An agent’s costs with respect to
one decision are independent of his costs with respect to the other decision.
The interaction between the two decisions is covered by the overall project’s
success probability. Combined with incentive payments, complementarity
resp. substitutability does have an impact on the agents’ decision behavior
in our model.
The agents’ decision behavior is subject to moral hazard (hidden action
problem). The principal needs to provide incentives to overcome their prefer-
1In Rajan and Zingales (2001), the hierarchy aﬀects the agent’s bargaining power, while
bargaining does not occur at all in our model.
2Aghion and Tirole (1997) introduce the eﬀort choice as a decision that inﬂuences the
decision-maker’s costs only.
3In task assignment models like Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), the agent incurs costs
form the task he is in charge of but not from any other task.
4ences, that is, to induce them to make decisions diﬀerent from their favorite
ones. Both agents’ liability is limited.4 While Aghion and Bolton (1992)
and Aghion and Rey (2002) investigate parties with diﬀerent wealth, we fol-
low Schmitz (2005) and assume both agents to be protected by completely
limited liability. The agents are wealth constrained or ex post payments are
not enforceable so that an agent could break up the contract and walk away
instead of paying.
While Schmitz (2005) compares integration (comparable to a vertical hi-
erarchy) and separation (comparable to a horizontal hierarchy) in case of
sequential actions, our decisions are made simultaneously. In Bester (2005)
and Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner (2005), asymmetric information aﬀects
the allocation of authority. Similarly, Dessein (2002) considers an agent who
has private information not available to the principal. While these mod-
els allow for communication or information aggregation, Athey and Roberts
(2001) consider asymmetric information without communication. They fo-
cus on the linkage between the allocation of decision rights and the design
of incentive schemes. In their model, incentivizing an agent to exert eﬀort
also inﬂuences his investment decision and vice versa. We diﬀer from these
models and assume information to be completely symmetric. Further, we
take the information as given independent of the hierarchical structure.5
In a vertical hierarchy, a multi-task problem6 might occur. A decision-
maker undertaking several non-contractible decisions optimizes the signal
payments base upon. If this is not perfectly aligned with the principal’s ob-
jective, the resulting choice is not optimal. In a horizontal hierarchy, each
agent is in charge of one decision only so that the principal can provide in-
centives that target a speciﬁc decision directly instead of eﬀecting the overall
project only. Nevertheless, this is no comparative advantage of the horizontal
hierarchy in our model since in all relevant cases, the multi-task problem is
no issue even in the vertical hierarchy.
A team problem7 can arise in a horizontal hierarchy. Even if the project
output reveals that someone made a decision diﬀerent from a stipulated
choice, the principal does not know who has deviated. A kind of free riding
is possible, making the moral hazard problem more severe compared to the
4Sappington (1983) introduced this moral hazard problem for a single agent.
5Diﬀerent from us, Qian, Roland, and Xu (2006) and Maskin, Qian, and Xu (2000)
compare several organizational forms that aﬀect the informational structure.
6For multi-task problems, see Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
7For team problems, see Alchian and Demsetz (1972).
5vertical hierarchy. This moral hazard in teams8 can be solved by breaking
the budget balance condition so that each agent’s marginal reward equals his
marginal costs for the eﬃcient decision. Such a payment scheme is feasible in
a horizontal hierarchy so that any project can be implemented, but limited
liability prevents the principal from extracting the whole surplus.
Several trade oﬀs between diﬀerent hierarchical structures have been an-
alyzed in the literature. Hart and Moore (2005) study the impact of gains
to coordination on the optimal hierarchy. Dessein, Garicano, and Gertner
(2005) deal with the potential synergies from coordination in a centralized
structure, which in turn might weaken incentives. In Corts (2005), solving
the multi-task problem conﬂicts with the eﬃcient allocation of risk. In our
model, all parties are risk neutral so that this is not an issue. We also do
not have any cost savings due to synergies. The impact of the hierarchical
structure in our model is to change the incentive payments the principal has
to provide. The trade oﬀ between the hierarchies in our model is between the
number of decision-makers to be incentivized and the size of the payments
needed to incentivize each decision-maker.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a simple model
of the allocation of authority among biased agents. In section 3, vertical
hierarchies are analyzed, while in section 4, we investigate horizontal hierar-
chies. Section 5 endogenizes the design of hierarchies, that is, the allocation
of authority, in order to ﬁnd the optimal ones. In section 6, we give a brief
summary along with the conclusions and open research questions.
2 The Model
This section describes a simple formal model of the allocation of authority
among diﬀerent agents. The timing is as follows: The principal oﬀers a con-
tract to the agents. The contract speciﬁes a payment scheme and allocates
the decision rights to the agents. The agents accept if their participation
constraints are fulﬁlled. The decision-maker(s) choose(s) the subprojects’
characteristics after the contract is signed. If each agent is in charge of one
decision (instead of one agent being in charge of both decisions), the agents
make their choices simultaneously. The project is undertaken, private costs
occur and the project output is realized. The payment scheme is executed.
The details are given in what follows.
8For moral hazard in teams, see Holmstrom (1982).
6A principal P hires two agents i = 1,2 to jointly undertake a project.
For a given agent i ∈ {1,2}, we denote the other agent with i−. The project
is characterized by the two parameters d1,d2 with dj ∈ Dj ⊆ R so that the
set of feasible projects is D1 ×D2 . One can view a project to consist of two
subprojects j = 1,2. Again, for a given subproject j ∈ {1,2}, we denote
with j− ∈ {1,2} the subproject diﬀerent from j. Throughout the paper,
we shortly speak of subproject dj instead of subproject j with characteris-
tic dj. To keep the analysis tractable, we assume binary decisions so that
Dj = {aj,bj}. The subprojects d1,d2 are non-contractible, but the principal
can contractually allocate the rights to choose them to the agents. An agent
who has the decision right over a subproject’s characteristic is said to have
authority over this subproject. We denote the allocation of authority with
δ = (δ1,δ2) where δj = i means that agent i gets the decision right over sub-
project j. If one agent receives authority over both subprojects, he is viewed
as the other agent’s superior. We speak of a vertical hierarchy. If each agent
receives authority over one subproject, this is called a horizontal hierarchy.
Project output is random. In case of success, the principal receives an
exogenously given output X > 0. In case of failure, no output is generated.
The success probability depends on the subprojects chosen and is denoted as
p(d1,d2). We assume
p(a1,a2) < p(a1,b2) = p(b1,a2) < p(b1,b2) < 1 (1)
and deﬁne
pbb := p(b1,b2), pab := p(a1,b2) = p(b1,a2), paa := p(a1,a2) . (2)
Further, we assume9
paa = 0 . (3)
The principal cares about the project’s success only and therefore always
prefers bj over aj. The success probability also incorporates the interaction
between the subprojects. If a switch from aj to bj increases the marginal





the subprojects are complements. If pab ≥ pbb/2, they are substitutes. Given
pbb and paa, a large pab is interpreted as a lot of substitutability resp. little
9The case paa > 0 is brieﬂy discussed in the conclusion.
7complementarity between the subprojects.
The agents do not care about the project output but favor certain projects.
These preferences are reﬂected by the private costs they incur. Each agents’
costs depend on both subprojects. Independent of who has chosen the sub-
project’s characteristic, the costs increase in the distance between the im-
plemented characteristic an the agent’s favorite one. We assume the agents’
preferences not to be aligned with the principle’s objective so that the agents
always prefer aj over bj. The cost functions are
c1(d1,d2) = l11`1 + l12`2 ,
c2(d1,d2) = l21`1 + l22`2 (5)
with lij > 010, `j = 1 if dj = bj and `j = 0 if dj = aj. If dj = bj, agent i incurs
a loss of lij. We speak of lij as agent i’s marginal costs on subproject j. With
respect to the costs, there is no interaction among subprojects. An agent’s
costs on one subproject are independent of his costs on the other subproject.
We say that agent i mainly cares or is more concerned about subproject j
if lij ≥ lij−. There are two main cases to distinguish. If both agents have
larger marginal costs on subproject j compared to the other subproject so
that l1j ≥ l1j− but l2j ≥ l2j−, we say the agents mainly care about the same
subproject. If one agent is more concerned about subproject j while the other
agent is more concerned about j− so that l1j ≥ l1j− but l2j < l2j−, we say
that the agents mainly care about diﬀerent subprojects. Further, the ratio
li := min{li1,li2}/max{li1,li2} turns out to play a decisive role. If li is close
to one, we say agent i has similar marginal costs on the subprojects. Both
decisions have a similar eﬀect on agent i. If this is true for both agents, we
can interpret it as a similarity of decisions. If li is small instead, we say agent
i hast diﬀerent marginal costs on the subproject. If, for example, l11 = l21 ≈ 0
and l12 = l22 > 0, the agents’ interests are perfectly aligned. Not only that
they both always prefer aj over bj, they do not really care about d1 but do
care about d2 to the same extent.
Payments condition on project output. The principal pays agent i a basic
wage vi independent of the project outcome and a success premium wi paid
in case of success only.11 We assume that the agents are protected by limited
liability so that all payments have to be non-negative.
10We exclude the case lij = 0 to avoid a situation in which agent i, if not receiving any
incentives, is indiﬀerent between dj = aj and dj = bj.
11This is equivalent to paying a wage wh in case of success and wl in case of failure.
More advanced payment schemes turn out not to improve the results.
8The principal and the agents are assumed to be risk neutral so that their
payoﬀ functions are composed of the expected output, the expected payments
and the private costs determined by the bias. We have the payoﬀs
UP = p(d1,d2)(X − w1 − w2) − v1 − v2 ,
U1 = p(d1,d2)w1 + v1 − c1(d1,d2) ,
U2 = p(d1,d2)w2 + v2 − c2(d1,d2) . (6)
The agents’ outside options are set to zero. The principal oﬀers a contract
which is accepted by the agents if and only if their participation constraints
U1,U2 ≥ 0 are fulﬁlled. A contract consists of a payment scheme W and
an allocation of authority (δ1,δ2). In case of a vertical hierarchy, we have
δ1 = δ2 and the decision-maker opportunistically chooses a project (d∗
1,d∗
2)








In a horizontal hierarchy, we have δ1 6= δ2 and the agents choose the sub-
projects simultaneously. This is a non-cooperative game and we assume the















For notational simplicity, we widely omit the asterisk. In case of multiple
equilibria,12 the principal decides which equilibrium is played.13 We do not
consider mixed equilibria. The principal oﬀers a contract which maximizes
her own payoﬀ subject to the agents’ participation constraints, the limited
liability constraints and the decision-maker’s incentive constraint resp. the
equilibrium conditions. Such a contract is called optimal. Overall expected
surplus is
S(d1,d2) = p(d1,d2)X − c1(d1,d2) − c2(d1,d2) . (9)
A project (d1,d2) which maximizes the surplus is called ﬁrst-best eﬃcient.
12To ensure the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, it might be necessary to discriminate
between the agents, as shown in Winter (2004).
13Think of the principal announcing her favorite equilibrium and the agents following
her recommendation since they cannot gain from deviating unilaterally.
93 Vertical Hierarchy
This section analyzes the vertical hierarchy in order to later on compare it
with the horizontal hierarchy. The following Lemma states the principal’s
payoﬀ dependent on the project she implements, taking as given that agent
i is the decision-maker in a vertical hierarchy.
Lemma 1 Let agent i be the decision-maker so that agent i− is his subordi-
nate. A principal who implements (a1,a2) can extract the whole surplus and
receives a payoﬀ UP = 0. She can implement (a1,b2) if and only if
li1 ≥ li2 and
pab
pbb − pab
li1 − li2 ≥ 0 . (10)
Again, she extracts the whole surplus and her resulting payoﬀ is
UP = pabX − li2 − li−2 . (11)
She can implement (b1,a2) if and only if
li2 ≥ li1 and
pab
pbb − pab
li2 − li1 ≥ 0 . (12)
She extracts the whole surplus and her resulting payoﬀ is
UP = pabX − li1 − li−1 . (13)
If the principal implements (b1,b2), she receives a payoﬀ





, li1 + li2

(14)
and she extracts the whole surplus if and only if
pab
pbb − pab
max{li1,li2} − min{li1,li2} ≤ 0 . (15)
If a project is ﬁrst best eﬃcient, there is always a vertical hierarchy that
allows the principal to implement this project.
Proof: see Appendix.
To implement a project diﬀerent from the decision-maker’s favorite (a1,a2),
the principal has to provide incentives. If the subprojects are highly com-
plementary so that (10) and (12) are not fulﬁlled, any success premium that
incentivizes the decision-maker to choose bj instead of aj for one subproject
also induces him to choose bj− instead of aj− for the other subproject. It is
10impossible to implement (a1,b2) or (b1,a2), but a principal who implements
(b1,b2) can extract the whole surplus. Now consider the case where (10)
or (12) is fulﬁlled, that is, the subprojects are suﬃciently substitutable and
the decision-maker’s marginal costs li1,li2 are suﬃciently diﬀerent so that he
cares much more about one of the subprojects than about the other one.
If the principal implements (b1,b2), she has to share the surplus with the
decision-maker. The left hand side in (15) reﬂects the share of the surplus
the principal has to give up. If this is large, we say that the decision-maker
is hard to incentivize. This is the case if there is a lot of substitutability and
the decision-maker’s marginal costs diﬀer a lot for the two subprojects so
that li = min{li1,li2}/max{li1,li2} is small.
The principal can incentivize the decision-maker to choose (a1,b2) or
(b1,a2), but she cannot inﬂuence which of these is chosen so that a multi-
task problem occurs. The principal cannot provide incentives which target
a speciﬁc subproject. The following Lemma endogenizes the allocation of
authority, that is, it analyzes who is the optimal superior.
Lemma 2 Take as given that the principal implements project (d1,d2). If
(d1,d2) 6= (b1,b2), every allocation of authority that allows the principal to
implement (d1,d2) is optimal. If (d1,d2) = (b1,b2), the optimal vertical hier-
archy allocates authority to agent i if and only if
pab
pbb−pab max{li1,li2} − min{li1,li2} ≤
max{0,
pab
pbb−pab max{li−1,li−2} − min{li−1,li−2}} . (16)
Proof: The results follow directly from Lemma 1. 
If the left hand side in (16) is non-positive, the principal can implement
(b1,b2) and extract the whole surplus when she allocates authority to agent
i. This allocation is clearly optimal. If the left hand side is non-positive
for both i = 1,2, the optimal allocation is not unique. If the left hand side
is positive for both i = 1,2, both allocations of authority do not allow the
principal to extract the whole surplus. The right hand side is also positive
and (16) reﬂects the share of the surplus the principal has to give up under
either allocation, which determines the optimal allocation. Since the princi-
pal cannot extract the whole surplus, she faces a trade oﬀ between surplus
maximization and rent extraction due to limited liability.14 The following
Lemma gives the conditions for ﬁrst best eﬃciency (not) being reached.
14Under unlimited liability, the principal could always extract the whole surplus by
choosing, if necessary, a negative vi.
11Lemma 3 The principal does not implement a ﬁrst best eﬃcient project if
and only if the following conditions hold at the same time:
1. The unique ﬁrst best eﬃcient project is (b1,b2).
2. The subprojects are suﬃciently substitutable or each agents’ marginal
costs diﬀer suﬃciently among subprojects15 so that
pab
pbb − pab
max{li1,li2} − min{li1,li2} (17)
is large enough for i = 1,2.16
3. For at least one subproject, the marginal costs are large enough so that
l11 + l21 or l12 + l22 is large enough.
Proof: see Appendix.
If a project diﬀerent from (b1,b2) is ﬁrst best eﬃcient, the principal can im-
plement it and extract the whole surplus. Condition 2 ensures that each
agent, if in charge, is so hard to incentivize that a principal who implements
(b1,b2) has to give up a large share of the surplus. The third condition en-
sures that choosing the most proﬁting project diﬀerent from (b1,b2) does not
decrease the surplus too much. The principal is better oﬀ by choosing this
project which leaves her with a (much) larger share17 of a (slightly) smaller
surplus. Note that condition 1 on the one hand and condition 2 and 3 on
the other hand might conﬂict. For example, increasing pab in order to fulﬁll
condition 2 might in turn lead to a violation of condition 1.
Further, the multi-task problem turns out to be irrelevant. A principal
desires to implement (b1,a2) (resp. (a1,b2)) if this project is ﬁrst best eﬃcient
or Lemma 3 applies. As can be seen from the proof of the Lemma, condition
2 implies that (10) or (12) is fulﬁlled. In either case, the principal can
implement the project. To provide a better intuition for our results, we
consider some examples.
15That is, each agent cares suﬃciently more about one subproject than the other subpro-
ject so that l1,l2 are large, but the agents might mainly care about diﬀerent subprojects.
16In condition 2 and 3, we do not explicitly mention the critical values because they do
not provide further insights. Further note that large enough does not necessarily mean
large in absolute terms.
17In fact, this share is 100% here.
12Example 1 Assume that agent 1 mainly cares about subproject d1 but
hardly cares about subproject d2, while for agent 2 it is the other way around.
Mathematically, this is l12,l21 → 0 and without loss of generality we set l22 >
l11. The principal can implement (a1,a2) no matter who receives authority.
To implement (a1,b2), she has to allocate authority to agent 1 and for (b1,a2)
to agent 2. In these three cases she extracts the whole surplus. If the principal
implements (b1,b2), she has to share the surplus with the decision-maker.
According to (16), she allocates authority to agent 1. The principal does not
























The left hand side of the inequality ensures that (b1,b2) is the unique ﬁrst
best eﬃcient project, while the right hand side ensures that the principal
prefers to implement a diﬀerent project. To illustrate the conditions 2 and
3 of Lemma 3, note that the right hand side is increasing in l11 = l11 + l21,
l22 = l21 + l22 and l11pab/[pbb − pab] = l11pab/[pbb − pab] − l12, while a large
l11pab/[pbb − pab] implies a large l22pab/[pbb − pab].
Example 2 Now assume both agents to be concerned about subproject
d1 but disinterested in subproject d2. Mathematically, we assume l12,l22 →
0 and without loss of generality l11 < l21. It is impossible to implement
(b1,a2) in a vertical hierarchy, and (b1,a2) cannot be ﬁrst best eﬃcient. Both
allocations of authority allow the principal to implement (a1,b2) or (a1,a2)
and to extract the whole surplus. If the principal implements (b1,b2), she
has to share the surplus with the decision-maker. She allocates authority to










Examples 1 and 2 have in common that, even under the optimal vertical
hierarchy, the decision-maker cares much more about one subproject than
about the other one. Substitutability has no impact on the optimal allocation
of authority.
Example 3 Assume l11 = l21 = l12 = l22 =: l. Both vertical hierarchies
generate the same results. If the subprojects are complements, it is impossible
13to implement (b1,a2) or (a1,b2). Given the complementarity, the decision-
maker’s marginal costs for the two subprojects are suﬃciently similar so that
the principal can implement (b1,b2) and extract the whole surplus. First best
eﬃciency is always reached. If the subprojects are substitutes, the principal
can implement (a1,b2) or (b1,a2). But for the substitutability present, the
decision-maker’s marginal costs for the subprojects are suﬃciently diﬀerent18
to force a principal who implements (b1,b2) to share the surplus with the
decision-maker. If the subprojects are substitutes, the principal does not





[pbb − pab]2 . (20)
4 Horizontal Hierarchy
This section analyzes the horizontal hierarchy. The following Lemma de-
scribes the principal’s payoﬀ dependent on the implemented project, taking
the allocation of authority as given.
Lemma 4 Take the horizontal hierarchy (δ1,δ2) with δ1 6= δ2 as given so that
agent δj is in charge of subproject j. A principal who implements (a1,a2) can
extract the whole surplus and receives a payoﬀ UP = 0. If she implements
(b1,a2), her payoﬀ is
UP = pabX − l11 − l21 (21)
and she extracts the whole surplus. For (a1,b2), she receives
UP = pabX − l12 − l22 (22)
and again she extracts the whole surplus. A principal who implements (b1,b2)
gets the payoﬀ










, l21 + l22

. (23)
She extracts the whole surplus if and only if
pab
pbb − pab
lδ11 − lδ12 ≤ 0 and (24)
pab
pbb − pab
lδ22 − lδ21 ≤ 0 . (25)
18Again, suﬃciently diﬀerent does not mean diﬀerent in absolute terms. In this case,
the marginals costs are in fact identical, but for the given substitutability, the condition
is fulﬁlled.
14Proof: see Appendix.
Diﬀerent from the vertical hierarchy, the principal can implement any project
(d1,d2) in both horizontal hierarchies. She can use a success premium to tar-
get directly the decision behavior on a certain subproject. We do not have a
multi-task problem in a horizontal hierarchy.
Again, a principal who implements (b1,b2) might have to give up a share
of the surplus. The larger the left hand side in (24) or (25), the harder it is
to incentivize the respective agent and the larger is the share of the surplus
this agent receives. If agent i is in charge of the subproject he cares more
about, he is hard to incentivize if
pab
pbb − pab
max{li1,li2} − min{li1,li2} (26)
is large, that is, if his marginal costs diﬀer a lot among subprojects so that
li is small. If agent i is in charge of the subproject he cares less about, he is
hard to incentivize if
pab
pbb − pab
min{li1,li2} − max{li1,li2} (27)
is large, that is, if his marginal costs diﬀer little among the subprojects so
that li is large. In general, the larger the marginal costs for the subproject
he is in charge of and the smaller the marginal costs for the other subproject,
the harder it is to incentivize the agent. Therefore, it is easier to incentivize
an agent who is in charge of the subproject he cares less about as if he
were in charge of the subproject he cares more about. The following Lemma
endogenizes the allocation of authority.
Lemma 5 If the principal implements (a1,a2),(a1,b2) or (b1,a2), the opti-
mal horizontal hierarchy is not unique. If the principal implements (b1,b2),

























, l21 + l22

. (28)
The allocation (δ1 = 2,δ2 = 1) is optimal if and only if ≥ holds in (28).
Proof: The proof is a direct comparison of the principal’s payoﬀs under
both allocations. 
15If the principal has to share the surplus under both allocations, she prefers
an allocation that makes it easy to incentivize the agents with respect to the
subprojects they are in charge of. There are two general cases. If the agents
mainly care about diﬀerent subprojects, the principal optimally puts each
agent in charge of the project he cares less about. Both agents are easier to
incentivize under this allocation compared to the alternative allocation. If
both agents mainly care about the same subproject, say d1, and the principal
implements (δ1 = 1,δ2 = 2), agent 1 is harder and agent 2 is easier to
incentivize compared to the alternative horizontal hierarchy. The optimal
allocation depends on the details of the parameter constellation. One agent
ends up in charge of the subproject he cares more about, while the other agent
gets authority over the subproject he is less interested in. Again, a principal
who cannot extract the whole surplus might face a trade oﬀ between surplus
maximization and rent extraction due to limited liability. The following
Lemma gives the conditions for ﬁrst best eﬃciency (not) being reached.
Lemma 6 Take as given that the principal has to allocate authority accord-
ing to a horizontal hierarchy. The principal does not implement a ﬁrst best
eﬃcient project if and only if the following conditions hold at the same time:
1. The unique ﬁrst best eﬃcient project is (b1,b2).
2. The subprojects are suﬃciently substitutable or
• both agents mainly care about diﬀerent subprojects and l1,l2 are
large so that their marginal costs diﬀer little among subprojects,
which ensures that (27) is large enough for both agents, or
• the agents mainly care about the same subproject and l1,l2 are
similar so that both agents’ marginal costs show a similar amount
of variation among subprojects, which ensures that (26) is large
enough for both agents or (27) is large enough for both agents
so that the expressions on both sides in (28) are large enough.
3. For at least one subproject, the marginal costs are large enough so that
l11 + l21 or l12 + l22 is large enough.
Proof: The proof is analog to Lemma 3. 
The ﬁrst two conditions guarantee that, under any horizontal allocation, a
principal who implements a ﬁrst best eﬃcient project has to give up a large
share of the surplus, that is, there is at least one agent who is signiﬁcantly
hard to incentivize. If the agents mainly care about diﬀerent subprojects, this
16is the case if their marginal costs do not diﬀer much among subprojects. If
both agents mainly care about the same subproject, the variation of marginal
costs among subprojects has to be similar for both agents. If, for example,
both agents’ marginal costs diﬀer a lot among subprojects, the one in charge
of the subproject they care more about is hard to incentivize under both
allocation. If both agents’ marginal costs vary little among subprojects, the
one in charge of the subproject they care less about is hard to incentivize
under both allocations. On the other hand, if agent 1’s marginal costs diﬀer
much more among subprojects than agent 2’s marginal costs do, the principal
can put agent 1 in charge of the subproject they care less about so that both
agents are easy to incentivize. Condition 3 ensures that there is a project
which is not ﬁrst best eﬃcient but generates a surplus not much smaller than
the ﬁrst best surplus. We continue the examples from the previous section.
Example 1 (cont.) It is l12,l21 → 0 and l22 > l11 so that the agents
mainly care about diﬀerent subprojects. If the principal implements (b1,b2),
she optimally chooses (δ1 = 2,δ2 = 1) so that each agent is in charge of the
subproject for which he as (approximately) no marginal costs. Independent
of the substitutability, each agent’s marginal costs diﬀer so much among
subprojects (that is, l1,l2 are so small) that the principal can extract the
whole surplus and a ﬁrst best eﬃcient project is always implemented.
Example 2 (cont.) It is l12,l22 → 0 and l11 < l21 so that the agents
mainly care about the same subproject. A principal who implements (b1,b2)
optimally sets (δ1 = 1,δ2 = 2). With respect to subproject 2, no incentives
are needed no matter who is in charge of it. With respect to subproject 1,
agent 1 is at least as easy to incentivize as agent 2 since (26) is smaller for
him. The remaining results are the same as if he were the decision-maker in
a vertical hierarchy.
Example 3 (cont.) It is l11 = l21 = l12 = l22 =: l. Both horizontal
allocations generate the same result. If the principal implements (b1,b2), she
can extract the whole surplus if and only if the subprojects are complements.
If the subprojects are substitutes instead, the principal has to share the










175 The Optimal Hierarchy
In this section, we completely endogenize the design of the hierarchy. If the
principal implements a given project (d1,d2), every allocation that allows the
principal to extract the whole surplus is optimal. Therefore, a principal who
implements (a1,a2),(b1,a2) or (a1,b2) is indiﬀerent between a vertical and a
horizontal hierarchy if and only if both hierarchies enable her to implement
the desired project. If it is impossible to implement the project in a vertical
hierarchy, the principal necessarily chooses a horizontal one. The following
Proposition analyzes the optimal hierarchy to implement (b1,b2).
Proposition 1 Consider a principal who implements (b1,b2). If the agents
mainly care about the same subproject, a vertical hierarchy is optimal. If
the agents mainly care about diﬀerent subprojects, a horizontal hierarchy is
optimal if and only if, for each agent, the marginal costs are suﬃciently
diﬀerent among the two subprojects so that (26) is large enough and (27) is
small enough for both agents.
Proof: see Appendix.
To interpret this result, we might say that a horizontal hierarchy is optimal
if the agents as well as the decisions are dissimilar. If the agents mainly care
about the same subproject and the principal chooses a horizontal hierarchy,
the agent in charge of the project they care more about receives the same ex-
pected wage payment as if he were the decision-maker in a vertical hierarchy.
The other agent receives an expected wage at least as high as if he were the
subordinate in a vertical hierarchy. If the agents mainly care about diﬀerent
subprojects, the optimal horizontal hierarchy puts each agent in charge of
the subproject he is less concerned about. Switching from the vertical to
the horizontal hierarchy saves the principal part of the decision-maker’s ex-
pected wage payment but might increase the other agent’s expected payment.
If there is an agent who has similar marginal costs for both subprojects, this
agent is quite easy to incentivize if he is the decision-maker in a vertical hier-
archy. It is only a little bit easier to incentivize him in the optimal horizontal
hierarchy, which is outweighed by the fact that the other agent’s participa-
tion constraint is binding in the vertical hierarchy. The principal can use a
horizontal hierarchy in order to gain from the diﬀerences between the agents’
costs. Note that there is no monotonicity in the sense that, for example,
the horizontal hierarchy is optimal if there is enough substitutability or vice
versa. Increasing pab increases both (26) and (27). As can be seen from (43)
in the proof, it depends on the marginal costs if increasing substitutabil-
ity works in favor of horizontal or vertical hierarchies. To provide a better
intuition, we continue our examples.
18Example 1 (cont.) It is l12,l21 → 0 and l22 > l11. If the principal imple-
ments (b1,b2), the horizontal hierarchy (δ1 = 2,δ2 = 1) is optimal.
Example 2 (cont.) It is l12,l22 → 0 and l11 < l21. In the limit, a principal
who implements (b1,b2) is indiﬀerent between agent 1 being the decision-
maker in a vertical hierarchy or implementing a horizontal hierarchy with
(δ1 = 1,δ2 = 2). But as long as l22 is positive, the vertical hierarchy is
strictly better.
Example 3 (cont.) It is l11 = l21 = l12 = l22 =: l. If the projects are
complements, we have already seen that a principal who implements (b1,b2)
can extract the whole surplus under any allocation. If the projects are sub-
stitutes, a vertical hierarchy is optimal. Each agent has the same marginal
costs for each subproject. Agents as well as subprojects are identical.
The following Lemma shows that even a principal who can freely choose
the allocation of authority still does not necessarily implement a ﬁrst best
eﬃcient project.
Lemma 7 The principal implements a project diﬀerent from ﬁrst best if and
only if the following conditions hold at the same time:
1. The unique ﬁrst best eﬃcient project is (b1,b2).
2. The subprojects are suﬃciently substitutable or
• the agents mainly care about the same subproject and l1,l2 are
small so that each agent’s marginal costs are suﬃciently diﬀerent
for the two subprojects, which ensures that (26) is large enough
for both agents, or
• the agents mainly care about diﬀerent subprojects and l1,l2 are not
too small and not too large so that each agent’s marginal costs for
the two subprojects are neither too similar nor too diﬀerent, which
ensures that (26) and (27) are large enough for both agents.
3. For at least one subproject, the marginal costs are large enough so that
l11 + l21 or l12 + l22 is large enough.
Proof: Condition 1 and 3 follow directly from Lemmata 3 and 6. Condition
2 follows from Lemmata 3, 6 and 16 as follows: If there is a lot of substi-
tutability, the agents are hard to incentivize under any allocation. First,
19assume that the agents mainly care about the same subproject so that a ver-
tical hierarchy is optimal. To ensure that under both vertical allocations the
decision-maker is hard to incentivize we need both agents’ marginal costs
to be very diﬀerent for the two subprojects so that (26) is large for both
agents. Now consider the case where the agents mainly care about diﬀerent
subprojects. To ensure that incentives are hard to provide under any alloca-
tion, we need (26) and (27) to be large enough. Keeping (27) constant while
increasing (26) might have two eﬀects: First, in the vertical hierarchy, the
principal has to give up a larger share of the surplus. Second, the horizontal
hierarchy might become better than the vertical one. But given that (27) is
large, the principal again has to give up a large share of the surplus. Analog
arguments apply for increasing (27) while keeping (26) constant. 
The parameter constellations described in Lemma 7 exist. If the agents
mainly care about the same subproject, we have already seen in Example 2
that the principal does not necessarily implement a ﬁrst best eﬃcient project
even if she can freely choose the hierarchy. In the following example, the
agents mainly care about diﬀerent subprojects, but the principal does not
always implement a ﬁrst best eﬃcient project.
Example 4 Let l12 = l21 =: l,l11 + l22 = 2l and pab = 3/4pbb. If the
principal implements (b1,b2), she cannot extract the whole surplus under
any allocation of authority. The optimal hierarchy is (δ1 = 2,δ2 = 1) so that
each agent is in charge of the project he cares less about. This horizontal
hierarchy results in an overall expected wage payment of 8l, while expected
wages in a vertical hierarchy were 11l. The principal does not implement a








This paper provides a simple model of the hierarchical structure of a ﬁrm
or organization. The advantage of the vertical hierarchy is that there is
only one decision-maker to be incentivized. But the principal might need
large incentive payments to overcome the decision-maker’s taste, especially
on the decision he is more concerned about. In a horizontal hierarchy, both
agents need to be incentivized. If the agents mainly care about diﬀerent de-
cisions, the principal might gain from these diﬀerences by putting each agent
in charge of the decision he cares less about. Compared to the vertical hi-
erarchy, there are lower expected wage payments to the superior but higher
20expected wage payments to the subordinate. This pays out if the agents’
marginal costs are very diﬀerent for the two subprojects, that is, each agent
is much more concerned about one subproject than about the other one. The
horizontal hierarchy is optimal if agents as well as decisions are dissimilar.
Due to limited liability, the principal might face a trade oﬀ between sur-
plus maximization and rent extraction. She implements a project diﬀerent
from ﬁrst best if, even under the optimal hierarchy, it is hard to provide the
necessary incentives. This is the case if there is a decision both agents care
much more about than the other decision or if the agents mainly care about
diﬀerent decisions, but their marginal costs for the subprojects are neither
too diﬀerent nor too similar.
Our main results hold true for more general success probability functions.
The binary character of the subproject’s choice and the project output have
no substantial impact. Further, if we allow for paa > 0, the principal cannot
extract the whole surplus if she implements (b1,b2),(b1,a2) or (a1,b2), but
the results do not change qualitatively. Now we relax the assumption that
the conﬂict of interest between the principal and the agents is as large as
possible and consider the alternative settings. If
paa > max{pbb, pab} , (31)
there is no conﬂict of interest at all and the hierarchy has no impact. Now
consider
paa < pbb < pab . (32)
In this setting, the project (b1,b2) is eﬀectively ruled out. It cannot be ﬁrst
best eﬃcient since it results in higher overall costs and lower success proba-
bility than (a1,b2) and (b1,a2). It is impossible to implement (b1,b2) under
any allocation of authority. Analog, in case of pab < paa < pbb, the projects
(b1,a2) and (a1,b2) cannot be ﬁrst best eﬃcient and it is impossible to imple-
ment them in either hierarchy. Apart from that, the results from the previous
sections are mainly replicated.
Changing the agents’ favorite subprojects does not provide new insights.
Assume we have paa < pab < pbb as in the previous sections, but agent 1 now
prefers d1 = b1. Obviously, the projects (a1,a2) and (a1,b2) cannot be ﬁrst
best eﬃcient and it is optimal for the principal to put agent 1 in charge of
subproject d1.
Further, our main results hold true in a setting with more than two deci-
sions or more than two agents. This enables additional hierarchies so that,
21for example, it might be optimal to have one agent in charge of two decisions,
another agent in charge of one decisions and a third agent in charge of no de-
cision, which is intermediate between horizontal and vertical hierarchies. But
the forces identiﬁed in our simpliﬁed model are still at work in the broader
setting.
In our model, a vertical hierarchy incorporates what Schmitz (2005) calls
the rent saving eﬀect known from task assignment problems. The rent (or the
incentive payment) used to induce a certain decision on one subproject also
positively eﬀects the decision on the other subproject. But if this rent is too
high, the vertical hierarchy is suboptimal. In Schmitz (2005), this situation
can occur due the complementarity between the two sequentially undertaken
decisions. The decision-maker might shirk in the ﬁrst stage since failure on
the ﬁrst stage reduces the eﬀect of eﬀort in the second stage, increasing the
agent’s rent on the second stage. It is so expensive to incentivize the agent
to exert high eﬀort on both stages that separated control rights (comparable
to a horizontal hierarchy) might be optimal since they reduce the eﬀect of
the complementarity. In our model, decisions are made simultaneously and
there is only one signal payments base upon so that this eﬀect is ruled out.
While the agents in Schmitz (2005) are identical, the potential advantage of
the horizontal hierarchy in our model is to gain from diﬀerences between the
agents’ cost functions.
In Bester (2005), complementarity of decisions implies the optimality of
centralized decisions, while substitutability might lead to decentralized de-
cisions being more eﬃcient. Since there are no incentive payments in his
model, each decision-maker always chooses his favorite project, which is in-
dependent of substitutability or complementarity. This is diﬀerent in our
model. Complementarity resp. substitutability inﬂuence the payments nec-
essary to induce a certain decision. As we have seen in the previous sections,
substitutability might work in favor of a vertical or horizontal hierarchy, de-
pendent on the agents’ costs.
Our approach does not only apply to ﬁrms but also to other institutions
and organizations, for example, administrations. Possible extensions of our
model include the interactions with task assignment or eﬀort incentives in
the spirit of Athey and Roberts (2001) or the integration of asymmetric
information. These are left for future research.
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24Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
A principal who implements a project (d1,d2) optimally chooses wi− =
0,vi− = ci−(d1,d2),vi = max{0,−p(d1,d2)wi + ci(d1,d2)} and the smallest
wi ≥ 0 that fulﬁlls the incentive constraint (7). A success premium wi which
enables the principal to implement (a1,b2) exists if and only if (10) is fulﬁlled,


















which is equivalent to (15).
It remains to be shown that a ﬁrst best eﬃcient project can always be
implemented. This is obvious for (a1,a2) or (b1,b2). Now assume (a1,b2) to
be ﬁrst best eﬃcient. We have to show that there is an i ∈ {1,2} fulﬁlling
(10). Assume that this is not the case. If li1 < li2 for i = 1,2, we have the
contradiction S(b1,a2) > S(a1,b2). If li2 ≤ li1 < [pbb − pab]li2/pab for i = 1,2,
we have
pab(l11 + l21) < [pbb − pab](l12 + l22) (35)














li−2 ≤ li−1 < li−2 (37)
hold, pbb − pab > pab and pbb − pab < pab are both implied which is again a
contradiction. In any other case, there is an i ∈ {1,2} for which (10) holds.
Analog results hold if (b1,a2) is ﬁrst best eﬃcient. 
25Proof of Lemma 3:
If there is a ﬁrst best eﬃcient project diﬀerent from (b1,b2), the principal can
implement it and extract the whole surplus so that condition 1 is necessary.
Condition 2 ensures that (15) does not hold under both possible allocations
so that the principal cannot implement (b1,b2) and extract the whole sur-
plus. Further, according to Lemma 1, the more proﬁting of the two projects
(b1,a2) and (a1,b2) can be implemented.
Let l11 ≥ l12 and (16) be fulﬁlled (the proof is analog for any other case).
A principal who implements (b1,b2) optimally allocates authority to agent 1.
She is better oﬀ by implementing (a1,a2) instead of (b1,b2) if and only if her
payoﬀ from (b1,b2) is negative, that is,




Implementing the more proﬁting of the two projects (a1,b2) and (b1,a2) leaves
the principal better oﬀ than (b1,b2) if and only if











+ l11 + l12 − l12 (40)
we get that increasing (17) while keeping l11 + l21 and l12 + l22 constant as
well as increasing l11 +l21 or l12 +l22 and keeping (17) constant increases the
right hand sides of (38) and (39). 
Proof of Lemma 4:
To implement a project (d1,d2), the principal optimally chooses the smallest
w1,w2 ≥ 0 that fulﬁll the equilibrium conditions (8) and
vi = max{0,−p(d1,d2)wi + ci(d1,d2)} (41)
for i = 1,2. Agent i’s participation constraint is binding if and only if
p(d1,d2)wi − ci(d1,d2) ≤ 0. The principal extracts the whole surplus if and
only if both agents’ participation constraints are binding. 
Proof of Proposition 1:
If both agents mainly care about subproject dj, the one in charge of sub-
project dj in a horizontal hierarchy receives the same expected wage as if he
26were the decision-maker in a vertical hierarchy. The other agents’ partici-
pation constraint may or may not bind in the horizontal hierarchy, but it is
binding in the vertical one. For each horizontal hierarchy, there is a vertical
one which oﬀers the principal at least the same payoﬀ.
Now assume that the agents mainly care about diﬀerent projects. With-
out loss of generality, assume l11 ≥ l12 and l22 ≥ l21 so that the principal
either implements a vertical hierarchy or puts agent i in charge of subproject
di. Assume that, in a vertical hierarchy, agent 1 optimally is the decision-
maker. Comparing the principal’s payoﬀs shows that the horizontal hierarchy









pbb−pab, l11 + l12
o
≥ −(l21 + l22) + max
n
pbbl21
pbb−pab, l21 + l22
o
. (42)




















The right hand side is small (27) is small for agent 2, while the left hand side
is large if (26) is large and (27) is small for agent 1. Further, (26) is large
for agent 2 since otherwise, it would not be optimal to have agent 1 as the
decision-maker in a vertical hierarchy. 
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